If a firm can contest the enforcement of an environmental regulation, neither increasing the probability nor severity of the fine will guarantee a reduction in a firm's illegally dumped waste. A policy that can unambiguously decrease illegal dumping is lowering the cost of legal disposal. This result occurs because the use of monitoring and fines to increase the probability or severity of enforcement triggers investment to evade enforcement, while a decrease in the costs of legal disposal does not. Investment in the resources to evade enforcement decreases the attractiveness of monitoring by significantly increasing the costs of environmental audits, administrative hearings, and judicial procedures. This occurs even with a high degree of regulator information about the firm's cost structure and no monitoring errors. In addition, if the regulator can only imperfectly monitor a firm's behavior so the firm can be accused of another firm's behavior, observable commitment to challenge enforcement will lead to overinvestment in resources to evade enforcement, an increased level of illegal dumping, and an overall increase in total costs relative to the unobservable case.
Introduction
The enforcement of environmental regulation has been examined in a variety of different contexts. In the case of perfectly enforceable constraints, the conventional rule is that the profit-maximizing firm will employ pollution control until the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost of resultant fines. Even under imperfect enforcement, this simple rule is not significantly altered unless the fine on pollution is partially avoided. (See for example Harford (1978) , Viscusi and Zeckhauser (1979), and Lee (1984) .)
A common assumption throughout the compliance literature is that a firm does not challenge the enforcement of an environmental regulation. The firm passively allows the regulator to impose a fine or penalty. But as Lee (1984) and Kambhu (1989; 1990 ) point out, a firm is actually quite active. 1 While the regulator attempts to impose a fine, a firm invests significant resources, both observable and unobservable, to avoid detection or to contest the action or to do both. Firm response to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) attempt to enforce the Comprehensive Environment Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (Superfund) is a good example of an observable investment. Rich (1985) argues that firms will spend more than $8 billion in litigation costs contesting the EPA's efforts to fine disposal of hazardous wastes, 79 percent to be paid by private parties. Yandle (1988) contends that eliminating these costs would free enough resources to clean more than 400 additional Superfund sites. Significant resources are being devoted to challenge the enforcement power of the environmental regulator. 3
This paper examines the efficacy of regulating illegal dumping of hazardous waste if the firm can challenge the enforcement of the regulation. Using a simple, short-run cost minimization model, we demonstrate that neither the traditional tactics of increasing the probability nor the severity of a fine will guarantee a reduction in illegal dumping. A policy that can unambiguously reduce illegal dumping is lowering the cost of legal disposal per unit produced, because both increased monitoring and larger fines trigger investment by the firm to challenge the regulator. Lowering the costs of legal disposal does not provide the same incentive. But lowering the cost does distort relative prices, thereby creating an explicit or implicit subsidy that can encourage the creation of additional hazardous waste. Therefore, lowering the cost of legal disposal will be most effective for a limited set of industries where entry is restricted, output price is set by a regulatory agency, output demand is inelastic, and access to resources to evade enforcement (e.g., legal services) is substantial.
An additional incentive to challenge enforcement arises by recognizing that multiple firms are regulated by the agency and that monitoring is imperfect. Under this scenario, when a firm is accused of violating a standard, it has an incentive to evade enforcement by identifying other firms who may also be responsible for the violation. When the regulator cannot perfectly monitor the source of pollution, we show that a firm's observable commitment to evade enforcement or fight off accusations made by other firms increases the overall illegal waste disposal by both firms. The firm who invests in observable actions such as lobbying, campaign contributions, advertising, or legal retainers increases the incentive to invest more to challenge enforcement. This induces the firm to further increase the level of illegal dumping. In efficiency terms, these results suggest that observable evasion expenditures are more costly than unobservable actions.
A Model of Illegal Dumping
Beginning with the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965, regulators have been concerned about the disposal of hazardous material. Fears of illegal "midnight" dumping have prompted policymakers to enact a common monitoring and enforcement scheme. Following Linder 1 Kambhu (1990) demonstrates that when fu'ms contest environmental regulations it may be more socially beneficial to use a command and control approach rather than an incentive-based regulation. 2 See Dower (1990) for more details on Superfund. Also see Tientenberg (1989) . 3
William Reilly, administrator of U.S. EPA notes that "[w]e spend as much time designing our rules to withstand court attack as we do getting the rules fight and out in the first place." See NYT (1991) . 4
See Copeland (1991) for a discussion of illegal dumping in the context of international trade of waste materials. He finds incentives to dump illegally in international waters given unilateral policy restrictions of the trade of waste.
